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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The course of proceedings in this case is adequately described in the Appellant's Brief. 
One element of the course of proceedings which was not discussed in the Respondent's Brief, 
and which remains critical to this appeal, is the actual ruling of the trier of fact. Many times, in a 
jury trial, there is no explanation of the reasoning of the jury. In this case, the course of 
proceedings is critical, because this was a court trial, and there is an explanation of the evidence, 
or lack thereof, that the trier of fact relied upon. In ruling, the court noted that "certainly there 
is a question" as to whether Mr. Stark was under the influence of drugs. Tr. p. 82. Instead of 
reaching a finding of innocence due to the presence of reasonable doubt, the trial court found 
that the impairment was due to the ingestion of drugs. Id A judgment of conviction was entered. 
R. p. 39. 
Statement of Facts 
The facts were adequately explained in the Appellant's Brief, and to the extent necessary, 
are reviewed in the argument portion of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
There was No Substantial, Competent Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Verdict. 
In Appellant's Brief, Stark outlined the reasons why the guilty verdict here is not 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. In Respondent's Brief, the State concedes that 
substantial, competent evidence is required, and then outlined several pieces of evidence that the 
State contends provide the substantial, competent evidence needed to support guilt. In reviewing 
the State's argument, this Court must keep in mind that the charge against Stark was not reckless 
driving, a traffic violation, use of profanity, or failure to cooperate with law enforcement. The 
charge against Stark was driving while under the influence of drugs or an intoxicating substance 
in violation ofIdaho Code § 18-8004(1)( a). 
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Also keep in mind that scientific tests for the presence of intoxicating substances were all 
negative. A breath test was performed for the presence of alcohol. Results of the test were 0.0. 
(Tr. p. 25, L. 1). The state also conducted a blood test. Results of the blood test showed no 
presence of intoxicating drugs of any kind, no presence of any level of the psychotropic 
medications Stark admitted he had taken five days before the traffic stop, and no presence 
of THe, the active ingredient that would have been present had Stark smoked marijuana 
on the day he was driving. (R. Ex. 1). 
A brief review of Idaho case law involving this Idaho Code section, where the prosecution 
relied upon the totality of the circumstances, does not reveal even one case where the defendant's 
behavior was the only proof of intoxication. For example, in one case the State relies upon, State 
v. Lesley, 133 Idaho 23, 81 P.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1999), the defendant was in a motor vehicle 
accident, smelled of alcohol, admitted using alcohol before the accident, admitted smoking 
marijuana the day before, the officer found marijuana in the car, and a urine test revealed the 
presence of marijuana and a central nervous system stimulant in the defendant's system. Despite 
this proof of many intoxicating substances in the defendant's system, the Court of Appeals stated 
that the evidence was not overwhelming, but was enough to uphold the verdict. In State v. 
Barker, 123 Idaho 162,845 P.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1992), also cited by the State, the defendant was 
found behind the wheel of a parked car, with a strong odor of alcohol, a cup of bourbon and 7 -
up between his legs. He took breath tests and tested at .10 and .10. There was substantial, 
competent evidence that the defendant was under the influence. 
In many reported cases the defendant admitted to having ingested intoxicating substances. 
In other cases, a breath test or blood test revealed the presence of intoxicating substances. In this 
case, both a breath test and a blood test were performed, and both were negative for the presence 
of intoxicating substances. So the evidence that the prosecution in this case relies upon is this: 
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• Violating a one-way traffic rule. The State would have this Court accept the premise 
that each time a driver drives the wrong way down a one-way street, that is evidence of 
intoxication. The observed behavior was only driving the wrong way. (Tr. p. 11, Ll. 10-
13; p. 30, Ll. 22-2S) The officer did not see any erratic driving, weaving, speeding, or 
other behavior, other than the action described above. (Tr. p. 30, Ll. 16-2S.) Wrong way 
driving is so common that transportation entities study the problem and make plans to try 
to prevent it. See e.g. http://d2dtISnnlpfrOr.cloudfront.netitti.tamu.eduidocuments/0-4128-
S.pdf. Mistakes in driving are a common occurrence. Such driving may constitute a 
crime resulting in charges of failure to yield, reckless driving or other types of charges. 
However, in order to find a defendant guilty of driving under the influence, there must be 
some evidence that the reason for the bad driving was that the defendant actually was 
under the influence of an intoxicating substance. That proof cannot be a "guess" based 
solely upon erratic driving. 
• Belligerence. The State would have the Court believe that each time a person is 
belligerent in response to a traffic stop, the presence of intoxicating substances should be 
presumed as the cause. 
• Refusal to follow instructions. An uncooperative attitude can occur even in those who 
are not under the influence of any substances. 
• Appearance of physical impairment. The State relies upon vague testimony of the 
arresting officer that Stark was dropping his head to his chest and bobbing his head 
around appeared dazed and apparently unable to keep his eyes open. (Tr. p. IS, Ll. 9-17, 
25; p. 16, L. 8). There was never any connection between this behavior and any 
intoxicating substances. For example, the officer did not smell alcohol and quickly 
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concluded that alcohol was not the cause of the behavior, but administered a breath test 
anyway, and the results were 0.0. Tr. p. 25, L. 1. 
• Refusal of DRE examination. Even though the State argues that the refusal of a DRE 
exam is evidence of guilt, this argument must be removed from the mix, because it would 
be unconstitutional to consider this as evidence of guilt, as addressed below. 
Respondent's Brief p. 6. 1 With the behaviors that the State relies upon to show substantial, 
competent evidence, there are multiple possible explanations, and no proof that the existence of 
intoxicating substances was the cause of the behavior. This is the quintessential definition of 
reasonable doubt, preventing a criminal conviction. The presence of intoxicating substances is 
an essential element of the crime. All of the other type of evidence usually relied upon in this 
type of case was absent here. 
The officer in this case, after a negative blood test, assumed that the behavior was the 
result of intoxicating drugs other than alcohol, so he administered a blood test, and the results of 
the blood test did not show the presence of any intoxicating drugs: not prescription medications, 
not illegal drugs, not even THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. The State admits that the 
only substance present in the blood test, Carboxy-THC, is not an intoxicating substance. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 6. See In Re: Driver's License Suspension of Reisenauer, 145 Idaho 948, 
188 P.3d 890 (2008). 
So where is the proof that the behavior was a result of intoxication, and not some other cause, 
such as psychological disturbance, inattentiveness, reckless driving, etc.? To draw an inference 
based on pure speculation would not be consistent with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1 The State also mentioned the presence ofa "baggie" in defendant's possession, and pointed out the allegation that 
such baggies are used to transport drugs. The Court could take judicial notice of the commonly known fact that 
baggies are also used to transport sandwiches and other common items. The officer testified below that there were 
no narcotics in the baggie, no flecks of any sort of drug, Stark was not charged with possession of paraphernalia and 
no testing was done on the baggie. This red herring is thus not part of any substantial competent evidence of 
intoxication, because it is simply no proof of anything at all. Tr. p. 34, Ll.8-25. 
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Perhaps the trial court said it best when he said: "certainly there is a question" as to whether 
Mr. Stark was under the influence of drugs. Tr. p. 82. If there is a question, the State has not 
proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor argued in this case that it was 
"possible" that there were some effects of the medication still in blood stream. Tr. P. 70, Ll. 13-
16. The State's case here invited the court to "guess" at whether intoxicating substances were 
present, and what the intoxicating substance was. Tr. P. 71. Even the trial court raised a 
question, indicating he did not know what intoxicating substance Stark was under the influence 
of. "Mr. Stark was impaired, he was under the influence of something. And the question 
becomes then, what? And my view of the evidence in this case is that although there certainly is 
a question, I'm satisfied that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the impairment 
was due to the ingestion of drugs." Tr. p. 62,LI. 11-18. The trier of fact, in this case the trial 
court, admitted that there was no way to determine what intoxicating substance Mr. Stark was 
under the influence of. Tr. p. 82. In its closing argument, the State appeared to concede its lack 
of evidence that Mr. Stark's impairment was the result of drugs or intoxicating substances. The 
State admitted, inter alia, as follows: 
I guess the point I would make in this case ... there is not a drug recognition evaluator that 
performed an evaluation. Ifthere had been ... ifthe Defendant had submitted to that, then 
we would be able to tie those two together (drugs and impairment). (Tr. p. 79,11.5-16). 
A judgment of conviction must be overturned on appeal where the state did not produce 
admissible evidence upon which the trier of fact could have found that the State sustained its 
burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cortez, 
135 Idaho 561, 562, 21 P.3d 498,499 (Ct.App.2001). With a negative breath and blood test, 
and no other evidence of intoxicating substances, the trier of fact could not have found guilt 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and this Court must overturn the trial court's verdict. State v. 
Anderson, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (Idaho 2008). 
The State in this case asks the court to uphold a conviction for a crime merely on the 
premise that the defendant "acted guilty." That is a slippery slope, and would violate the 
constitutional right of defendants to proof of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
II. The Refusal of Mr. Stark to Cooperate with the DRE Evaluation Cannot Be Used as 
Evidence of Guilt, and Does Not Excuse the Absence of Substantial, Competent Evidence 
The State makes the bold assertion in the Respondent's Brief that the refusal to submit to 
a drug recognition expert (DRE) examination is like an admission of guilt. The State relies upon 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), arguing that the refusal of a DRE exam is 
circumstantial evidence of a consciousness of guilt. But a close review of the Neville case 
reveals the reason for such a ruling: a breath test is physical evidence, and not "communication" 
evidence that would be prevented by the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination. But a closer look at the substance of a DRE examination reveals that critical 
elements of that examination include interrogation of the suspect. In State v. Baity, 991 P.2d 
1151 (WA 2000) the court outlined the DRE protocol standard across the country. It involves 
twelve steps: 
(1) breath (or blood) alcohol concentration; (2) interview of the arresting officer; (3) 
preliminary examination; (4) eye examinations; (5) divided attention tests; (6) vital 
signs examination; (7) darkroom examination of pupil size; (8) examination of muscle 
tone; (9) examination of injection sites; (10) statements, interrogation; (11) opinion; 
(12) toxicology analysis. 
Id. at 1155. The court pointed out that the protocol requires that all twelve steps be completed, 
and the evaluation must be based upon all twelve steps. Steps number 3 and 10 require 
interrogation of the suspect, gathering information from the suspect on medical history, drug and 
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alcohol history, and any admissions they might make about their behavior leading up to the 
arrest. State v. Baity, p. 1155. See also State v. Daly, 775 N.W2d 47 (NE 2009) (The DRE 
examination includes at least two interviews of the suspect, where the suspect is required to 
provide information about medical or mental or physical status, then submit to a final 
interrogation concerning the behavior and possible causes of the behavior.); State v. Klawitter, 
518 N.W.2d 577,580 (Minn. 1994)(DRE involves questioning of the suspect in which the officer 
should suggest that the officer knows the suspect has used certain drugs). Because completion of 
a DRE exam requires communication from the suspect, and in fact includes an element of 
attempting to force the defendant to admit the use of illegal drugs, refusal to participate cannot 
be used as consciousness of guilt without violating the Fifth Amendment. 
There is no other case in our system of criminal justice where a court found the defendant 
guilty, and the verdict was upheld on appeal, where the defendant merely "looked guilty" or 
"acted guilty." A defendant should not be found guilty of murder ifhe merely "acted guilty." 
There are too many possible explanations of the type of behavior noted in this case, and the 
presence of other rational explanations require the conclusion that there is a reasonable doubt as 
to guilt. A court cannot convict of a crime in the face of positive proof that no crime was 
committed, merely on the assumption that the defendant must have done something wrong, 
because he looked guilty. 
III. The Issue of a Requirement of Connecting Intoxicating Substances to the Behavior 
through a DRE or other Testimony has Been Adequately Raised in this Case. 
The State takes issue with Stark's argument that DRE evidence would have been required 
to prove the crime in this case. The State argues that this argument was waived because it was 
not raised until a reply brief in the district court. Stark's argument about the necessity ofDRE 
evidence relates to the lack of any other evidence to support the presence of intoxicating 
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substances. Stark has argued throughout this case that the proof offered falls far short of the 
substantial competent evidence required. The testimony and evidence provided does not allow 
the types of inferences required where the scientific tests are negative. In any case, the State has 
had ample opportunity in this appeal to brief and argue this issue, thus there should be no 
concern about considering the impact of the lack of some kind of expert testimony to prove that 
intoxicating substances were actually present here. 
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CONCLUSION 
With respect to drugs or intoxicating substances, the State proved through the 
forensic blood test results that there were !!Q drugs or intoxicating substances in Mr. 
Stark's blood at the time the blood sample was drawn. The test results were negative! 
Given the complete absence of any competent substantial evidence that marijuana, drugs 
or any intoxicating substances were present, and the cause of erratic or unusual behavior, Mr. 
Stark's conviction must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11-day of November, 2012. 
-~tht,~.J)~ 
Bobbi K. Dominick 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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